Ending the Islamic Republic is not about revenge or ideology. It is about removing the single greatest driver of instability, terrorism, and nuclear risk in the Middle East
For years, policymakers and analysts have obsessed over how the Islamic Republic of Iran might fall.
Far less attention has been paid to the more important question: whether it should.
To many of the several million Iranians who have fled their homeland since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the answer is obvious — and deeply personal.
Before the mullahs seized power, Iran was a modern, secular state. Women enjoyed far greater political and social freedom. Western culture was welcomed, not criminalised. Oil wealth fuelled economic growth instead of terror abroad. By any honest measure, what replaced that Iran has been an unmitigated failure.
For some, the case against the regime is moral. Iran’s Shia theocracy enforces a medieval interpretation of Islamic law, brutalises women, executes dissidents, and rules through fear. It seeks to export its extremist ideology far beyond its borders. That alone makes it a threat to all freedom-loving people.
But the most compelling argument is strategic — and it aligns squarely with the principles of America First.
The Islamic Republic is not merely a repressive domestic dictatorship, now widely suspected of killing thousands of demonstrators during the largest popular uprisings since the regime’s founding. It is the world’s most aggressive state sponsor of terrorism — the central node of a proxy empire stretching from Yemen to Lebanon, and from Gaza to Venezuela.
Over four decades, the regime and its proxies have killed and maimed thousands of Americans, from Beirut to Iraq and beyond, making Iran one of the most lethal adversaries the United States has faced since World War II.
Even today, Tehran is threatening renewed militia attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and building a massive missile arsenal — including an expanding intercontinental ballistic missile capability that threatens the American homeland, Israel, U.S. forces, and key regional allies — while supplying Russia with Iranian-made drones to fuel Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.
These are not isolated acts. They are components of a single, coherent Iranian strategy: to bleed American power, destabilise U.S. allies, and reshape the regional order in Iran’s favour. As long as the mullahs rule in Tehran, the United States remains under constant threat.
No diplomatic agreement has changed this reality. Sanctions relief did not moderate the regime’s behaviour. Engagement did not empower reformers. On the contrary, every outreach to Tehran strengthened the Revolutionary Guard and expanded Iran’s external aggression.
After four decades, the lesson is unmistakable: the problem is not Iran’s policies. It is Iran’s regime.
Critics warn that calling for the end of the Islamic Republic risks chaos or a nationalist backlash that could prop up a wobbling government. This fear rests on outdated assumptions.
For almost two decades — since 2009 — Iranians have flooded the streets, chanting ‘Death to the dictator’ and ‘Our enemy is right here.’ A majority have rejected clerical rule that has delivered only economic collapse, repression, and international isolation. The mullahs remain in power through violence, censorship, and fear — not popular consent.
Supporting the Iranian people is not about imposing a Western system or engineering a revolution. It is about aligning American policy with the clear aspirations of a population that overwhelmingly rejects theocracy. Importantly, Iran’s democratic opposition abroad has spent years developing a detailed, credible plan for the day after the regime’s fall — addressing governance, economic recovery, and relations with the outside world — undercutting claims that collapse would mean chaos.
What would come after the mullahs? No one should pretend the transition would be easy. But the choice is not between a perfect democracy and the status quo. It is between a collapsing theocracy that exports terror — and a post-Islamic Republic Iran that, at minimum, no longer wages permanent war against its neighbours and the United States.
A post-regime Iran would not need to become a Jeffersonian democracy to represent a dramatic strategic improvement. A government more accountable to its people would have powerful incentives to rebuild an economy shattered by corruption and sanctions — and to redirect resources from foreign militias to domestic needs.
For the first time in decades, regional de-escalation would become possible.
Until recently, Hezbollah’s arsenal of more than 150,000 rockets threatened Israel, Hamas’s war machine hung over Israel like a sword, and Houthi terrorists endangered global shipping lanes. A combined U.S.–Israeli response after October 7 severely degraded these threats. The world is safer for it — but only temporarily. Given time and space, Iran’s proxies will rebuild.
The United States does not need to invade Iran to end this menace. But it must abandon the illusion that the Islamic Republic can be reformed or indefinitely managed.
A strategy of targeted military and cyber strikes, maximum financial pressure, diplomatic isolation, information support for the Iranian people, and clear political alignment with their demands for change is not reckless. It is overdue.
Ending the Islamic Republic is not about revenge or ideology. It is about removing the single greatest driver of instability, terrorism, and nuclear risk in the Middle East.
The truth is uncomfortable but unavoidable: as long as the mullahs rule in Tehran, the Middle East will remain a factory for terror, missiles, and nuclear blackmail. Every delay buys the regime time. Every illusion of reform prolongs the danger. The Islamic Republic has spent 45 years declaring war on the United States and its allies — and it has never meant peace.
History will not judge America by how carefully it managed this regime, but by whether it finally had the resolve to end it. The moment is coming. The only question left is whether Washington has the courage to act before the next catastrophe forces its hand.
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Iran’s collapse or survival hinges on one choice inside the Revolutionary Guard
Iran is not merely experiencing another wave of street protests. It is facing a crisis that strikes at the core of the Islamic Republic—and, for the first time in years, places the regime’s survival in real doubt.
Across Iran, demonstrations sparked by economic collapse and corruption have rapidly transformed into direct challenges to clerical rule. Security forces have responded with live fire, mass arrests, and communications blackouts. International reporting cites hundreds of people killed and thousands detained. Internet shutdowns point to a regime determined to suppress not only dissent, but proof of it.
Iran has behaved this way before. What has changed is the strategic environment—and the growing sense among Iranians that the system itself is failing.
Still, one must be clear-eyed: Iran’s leaders will not go quietly. They do not see themselves as ordinary autocrats clinging to power. In their own theology, they see themselves as executing Allah’s will.
A Regime That Sees Repression as Divine Duty
Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has framed its authority through velayat-e faqih—the rule of the Islamic jurist. Under this doctrine, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not simply a political figure. He is the guardian of an Islamic revolution believed to be divinely sanctioned.
In this undated photo, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured seated next to senior military official in Iran. (Getty Images)
That theological worldview directly shapes how the regime responds to dissent. When Iranian security forces fire into crowds, the regime does not see itself as suppressing political opposition; it sees itself as crushing heresy, sedition, and rebellion against God’s order. Protesters are routinely labeled “corrupt on earth,” a Quranic phrase historically used to justify severe punishment.
Public condemnation and moral appeals alone will not move Tehran. Its rulers believe endurance, sacrifice, and violence are virtues—especially when used to preserve the revolution.
Even regimes driven by religious certainty can collapse once their power structures fracture.
Why this moment differs from 2009—or 2022
Iran has seen mass protests before. In 2009, the Green Movement threatened the regime after a disputed election. In 2022, nationwide protests erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman who died in morality-police custody after being detained for allegedly violating Iran’s hijab rules. Each time, the regime survived.
Several factors suggest this moment is different.
First, the economy is far worse. Iran faces sustained currency devaluation, unemployment, and inflation that has crushed the middle class and hollowed out state legitimacy. That pressure is compounded by a deepening water crisis that has crippled agriculture, strained urban life, and fueled unrest in multiple provinces. Economic despair is no longer peripheral; it now sits at the center.
Beyond economics, Iran’s external deterrence has eroded. The war with Israel in 2025 inflicted real damage. Senior Iranian commanders were killed. Air defenses were penetrated. Missile and drone infrastructure was disrupted. Iran’s aura of invulnerability—carefully cultivated over decades—was badly shaken.
At the same time, Iran’s proxy network is under strain. Hamas has been devastated. Hezbollah has suffered significant losses and now faces domestic pressure in Lebanon. The Houthis remain disruptive but isolated. Tehran’s so-called “axis of resistance” looks less like an unstoppable force and more like a series of costly liabilities.
Most importantly, the regime’s coercive apparatus is under stress. And this is where the future of Iran will be decided.
Watch the IRGC and the Basij—the outcome may hinge on their choices
No institutions matter more right now than the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its paramilitary arm, the Basij.
Often described as the regime’s “eyes and ears,” the Basij are not a conventional military force but a nationwide population-control and internal surveillance network. Embedded in neighborhoods, universities, factories, and mosques, they monitor dissent, identify protest organizers, and move quickly to intimidate or detain them—often before demonstrations can spread.
During past unrest, including the 2009 Green Movement and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, Basij units played a central role in suppressing resistance through beatings, arrests, and close coordination with IRGC security forces. Their value to the regime lies not in battlefield strength, but in omnipresence and ideological loyalty.
Their mission is to control dissent at the local level—before it becomes national. As long as the Basij remain loyal and effective in towns, neighborhoods, and campuses, the regime can contain unrest. If they hesitate, defect, or stand aside, Tehran’s grip weakens rapidly.
The Basij are the real instrument of population control. If the regime is forced to deploy the IRGC widely for internal order, it signals that local control has failed—and that the system is under far greater strain.
The Trump administration should be careful not to hand Tehran the propaganda victory it wants. Loud declarations about regime change from Washington risk delegitimizing Iranian voices. Support the people. Isolate the killers. Let the regime own its crimes.
The IRGC, by contrast, controls the military and functions as an economic empire. Beyond internal security, the IRGC also shapes Iran’s foreign policy—overseeing missile forces, regional proxies, and external operations. It exists to defend the revolution abroad, while the Basij exists to control society at home.
Over the past three decades, the IRGC has embedded itself in Iran’s most important industries—energy, construction, telecommunications, transportation, ports, and black-market finance. Entire sectors of the Iranian economy now depend on IRGC-controlled firms and foundations.
This creates a decisive tension. On one hand, the IRGC has every reason to defend the regime that enriched it. On the other, prolonged instability, sanctions, and economic collapse threaten the very assets the Guards control. At some point, self-preservation may begin to compete with ideological loyalty.
That is why Iran’s future may depend less on what protesters do in the streets—and more on whom the IRGC ultimately chooses to back.
Three outcomes appear plausible.
The first is repression. The Basij could maintain local control while the IRGC backs the Supreme Leader, allowing the regime to crush dissent, and impose order through overwhelming force. This would preserve the Islamic Republic, but at the cost of deeper isolation and long-term decay.
The second is continuity without clerical dominance. A “soft coup” could sideline aging clerics in favor of a military-nationalist leadership that preserves core power structures while shedding the regime’s most unpopular religious figures. The system would remain authoritarian—but altered.
The third is fracture. If parts of the Basij splinter or stand aside—and the IRGC hesitates to intervene broadly—the regime’s internal control could unravel quickly. This is the least likely outcome, but the most transformative—and the one most favorable to long-term regional stability.
Revolutions tend to succeed not because crowds grow larger, but because security forces eventually stop obeying orders.
America’s strategic objective: clarity without ownership
The United States must be disciplined about its goal.
America should not seek to “run Iran,” redraw its culture, or impose a leader. That approach has failed elsewhere. But neither should Washington pretend neutrality between an abusive theocracy and a population demanding dignity.
Our strategy is clear:
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